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Non-technical summary 
This paper presents a new corporate microsimulation model, ZEW TaxCoMM, which allows for the 
coherent micro-based analysis (ex ante and ex post) of reform induced revenue implications and the 
distribution of the tax burden between firms of different characteristics. In this paper, ZEW 
TaxCoMM is employed to evaluate the consequences of the 2008 German corporate tax reform. 
The German corporate tax reform of 2008 has brought about important cuts in corporate tax rates, 
which were at the same time accompanied by significant changes in the determination of the tax base 
for both major German corporate taxes - corporate income tax and trade tax. The reform followed the 
distinct and internationally prevalent pattern of tax rate cut cum base broadening. Hence, the results on 
the distribution of the tax burden according to firm characteristics stand exemplarily for those reforms 
which follow a similar pattern. Especially in view of the current economic crisis, questions on the 
distribution of the tax burden among firms of different characteristics have arisen and still remain at 
the heart of the academic and political debate in Germany and other countries. 
As a result, the ZEW TaxCoMM simulations show that less than 5% of all corporations did not benefit 
from the 2008 German corporate tax reform. The average annual relief as measured by the average 
decline in the effective tax burden on cash flows amounts to 2.8 percentage points for large 
corporations and to 6 percentage points for small corporations. Clearly, small firms benefited more. As 
to tax revenues, the reform induced decrease amounts to € 9.8 billion. The decline in tax revenues is 
more important for the corporate income tax. The trade tax thus gains fiscally in importance. 
Furthermore, the simulation illustrates that firms with low profitability, high debt ratio and high capital 
intensity benefit least from the reform. This is a consequence of the reform detaching the tax base 
from profits by banning the deduction of business expenses. This additionally endangers the existence 
of firms in times of massive economic downturn. Indeed, policy makers in Germany and other 
countries reacted by modifying the most harmful regulations which implied the taxation of economic 
worth instead of profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zusammenfassung  
Dieser Beitrag präsentiert ein neues Mikrosimulationsmodell, das ZEW TaxCoMM, welches für auf 
Mikrodaten basierende Analysen der Auswirkungen von Unternehmenssteuerreformen entwickelt 
wurde. ZEW TaxCoMM simuliert sowohl die Verteilung der Belastungswirkungen einer Reform als 
auch ihre steuerlichen Aufkommenswirkungen. In diesem Papier wird ZEW TaxCoMM eingesetzt, 
um die Auswirkungen der deutschen Unternehmenssteuerreform 2008 zu bewerten.  
Die deutsche Unternehmenssteuerreform des Jahres 2008 verbindet eine deutliche Senkung der 
steuerlichen Tarifbelastung von Unternehmen mit einer Verbreiterung der Bemessungsgrundlagen der 
Körperschaftsteuer sowie der lokalen Gewerbesteuer. Die Reform folgt damit einem gängigen Muster, 
dem sog. tax rate cut cum base broadening.  
Die in diesem Papier ausgewiesenen Reformkonsequenzen in Abhängigkeit struktureller 
Unternehmensmerkmale stehen daher exemplarisch für Reformen in anderen Ländern, die einem 
ähnlichen Muster folgen. Insbesondere angesichts der gegenwärtigen wirtschaftlichen Verwerfungen 
sind Fragen nach einer sinnhaften steuerlichen Belastung heterogener Unternehmen in den Fokus der 
wissenschaftlichen und politischen Debatte gerückt.  
Im Ergebnis zeigen die Simulationen auf Basis des ZEW TaxCoMM, dass weniger als 5% aller 
Kapitalgesellschaften in Deutschland nicht von der Unternehmenssteuerreform 2008 profitiert haben. 
Die durchschnittliche jährliche Entlastung, gemessen am durchschnittlichen Rückgang der effektiven 
Steuerbelastung des Cash Flows, beträgt 2,8 Prozentpunkte für Großunternehmen und 6 
Prozentpunkte für kleine Unternehmen. Kleine Firmen haben damit weitaus deutlicher von der Reform 
profitiert. Mit Blick auf die Aufkommenswirkungen der Reform ermittelt ZEW TaxCoMM einen 
reformbedingten Rückgang der Steuereinnahmen in Höhe von 9,8 Milliarden Euro. Der Rückgang der 
Steuereinnahmen betrifft vor allem die Körperschaftsteuer. Die Gewerbesteuer gewinnt somit 
fiskalisch an Bedeutung.  
Darüber hinaus zeigt die Simulation, dass Unternehmen mit geringer Rentabilität, hohem 
Schuldenstand oder hoher Kapitalintensität am wenigsten von der Reform profitieren. Dies ist eine 
Folge der reformgetriebenen Abkopplung der steuerlichen Bemessungsgrundlage von den 
Unternehmensgewinnen. Dies bedeutet eine zusätzliche Gefährdung der Existenz von Unternehmen in 
Zeiten eines massiven wirtschaftlichen Abschwungs. In der Tat hat die Politik auf diese 
Fehlentwicklung bereits reagiert. Zahlreiche Regelungen, die mit einer Besteuerung der 
Unternehmenssubstanz anstelle des Unternehmensgewinns einhergingen, wurden korrigiert. 
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the current economic crisis, questions on the distribution of the tax burden among firms of 
different characteristics have arisen and still remain at the heart of the academic and political 
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In this paper we present a new corporate microsimulation model, ZEW TaxCoMM, which al-
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in accordance with the tax code. To smooth out distortions between the sample and the popu-
lation of German corporations, the sample is extrapolated on the basis of the corporate income 
tax statistic. 
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age decline in the effective tax burden on cash flow amounts to 2.8 percentage points for large 
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1 Introduction 
Economists have a long standing experience in capturing the incentives of taxation on micro-
economic decision behavior. Approaches based on the neoclassical investment theory (Hall 
and Jorgenson (1967), King and Fullerton (1984), Devereux and Griffith (1999)) consistently 
reveal the distorting effects of taxation, particularly on corporate investment and financing 
decisions. However, their microeconomic foundation prevents these models from being appli-
cable for purposes other than the identification of tax incentives on rational, i.e. tax minimiz-
ing, representative agents. As a consequence, the coherent analysis of implications of tax re-
forms for tax revenue and the distribution of tax consequences across firms has remained a 
largely unresolved issue. Still, providing this information to decision makers is required of 
comprehensive economic tax policy analysis. Otherwise, a thorough ex ante evaluation of ex-
isting tax regimes and possible reform scenarios is not feasible. We present a corporate micro-
simulation model - ZEW TaxCoMM - which closes the identified methodological gap. In its 
current stage of development, ZEW TaxCoMM is designed particularly to simulate German 
corporate tax law and corresponding reforms.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we highlight the central chal-
lenges corporate microsimulation models have to meet. Furthermore, we provide a review of 
existing models and contrast their fundamental characteristics with the ZEW TaxCoMM ap-
proach. Section 3 provides a brief outline of its basic idea and structure. In Section 4, the 
ZEW TaxCoMM will be employed for evaluating the German corporate tax reform 2008 that 
constitutes a typical tax rate cut cum base broadening reform with particular restrictions on 
the deduction of interest expenses. Resorting on a broad sample of heterogeneous firms, ZEW 
TaxCoMM determines how the tax burden is distributed according to sector and company 
size and establishes a relation between firm characteristics and the impact of the tax reform. 
Moreover the reform induced changes in tax revenue are derived. Section 5 derives policy im-
plications in view of an economic crisis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Corporate Microsimulation as an Instrument of Tax Policy Analysis 
Microsimulation models, by definition, trace or simulate all analytically relevant processes 
and interdependencies at the lowest level of aggregation, i.e. the single economic agent. Due 
to their micro-level perspective, these models are able to precisely capture central agent cha-
racteristics and their response to (alternative) legal settings (Creedy (2001)). Since microsi-
mulation models do not only rely on one economic agent but process real data on a vast num-
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ber of subjects, they are able to broadly and authentically anticipate the consequences of poli-
cy reforms (Orcutt et al. (1976)). With special regard to tax reform scenarios, the ex ante as-
sessment of corresponding distributional and revenue implications becomes possible. Indeed, 
microsimulation models of households have already been successfully applied in the evalua-
tion of transfer and benefit policies (see inter alia Fuest et al. (2005), Arntz et al. (2008)).1 
However, up to now, they have been less established for the analysis of the corporate sector 
(Bardazzi et al. (2004)).  
 
On the one hand, as compared to household data, the availability of quantitative micro infor-
mation on firms has traditionally been more limited. Especially in Europe, databases with 
firm-level financial accounting information have emerged only in recent years. The access to 
comprehensive original tax data is even more restricted. In Germany, official firm-level tax 
data is available for selected flow variables only. Hence, the duality of financial and tax ac-
counting is one of the major challenges corporate microsimulation has to cope with. While 
household microsimulation models can directly refer to economic flow data, corporate micro-
simulation must possibly process a multitude of stock and flow variables from the financial 
accounting sphere and transform them according to tax accounting provisions. Otherwise, the 
model might only be able to capture the effect of a change in nominal tax rates, rather than a 
reform of tax base regulations. Another issue closely linked to the aspect of data availability is 
the models’ capacity to allow for general conclusions with respect to the whole population of 
corporate firms. If the microsimulation is based on a representative sample, there should not 
be such a problem. However, particularly samples of firm-level financial accounting data 
rarely fulfill this criterion. Still, based on detailed aggregate information covering the total 
population of firms, an appropriate weighting scheme might be constructed even for arbitrary, 
i.e. non-random, samples. In this case, conclusions referring to the whole population of firms 
could still be drawn. 
 
On the other hand, a second source of increased complexity is the existence of inter-temporal 
effects of tax provisions governing the tax base (depreciation, loss offset, etc.) which go 
beyond the merely one-periodic perspective in the tax assessment of households. Consequent-
ly, the time horizon covered by corporate microsimulation should also be multi-periodic in 
                                                            
1  A comprehensive overview of these household microsimulation models is provided by O’Hare and Gupta 
(2000) and - with a special focus on Germany – by Wagenhals (2004). 
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order to consistently trace firm-level developments of fundamental tax base variables over 
time (dynamic microsimulation).  
Defining these sources of conceptual complexity as central requirements of corporate micro-
simulation models allows categorising existing models relative to the new approach 
represented by the ZEW TaxCoMM and described in more detail in Section 3. In total, three 
corporate microsimulation models with a specific focus on tax policy evaluation exist (see 
Table 1). Precisely, these are the Italian microsimulation model DIECOFIS, a model provided 
by the Canadian ministry of finance and BizTax, a microsimulation approach designed to ana-
lyse business tax reforms in Germany which has been put forward by the German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW). The Italian DIECOFIS2 project led to the development of a cor-
porate microsimulation model under the aegis of the Italian statistical office ISTAT (Castel-
luci et al. (2003), Oropallo and Parisi (2005)). The DIECOFIS microsimulation model is a 
one-periodic model based on cross-sectional real financial accounting data. The representative 
dataset (29,196 corporations, reporting year 2000) underlying the DIECOFIS model has been 
assembled from numerous sources comprising published financial statements and survey data 
on Italian firms. In order to simulate the corporate tax burden of companies, the given finan-
cial accounting data are first transformed into tax data. Subsequently, the firm-specific corpo-
rate income is computed in a very detailed way and then multiplied with the statutory corpo-
rate income tax rate. 
 
Table 1: Corporate Microsimulation Models in Applied Tax Policy Analysis 
 
 ZEW 
TaxCoMM 
DIW 
BizTax DIECOFIS 
Canadian 
Corporate 
Microsim. 
Si
m
ul
at
io
n 
de
si
gn
 Detailed ascertainment of 
profits 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Dynamic simulation 
(multi-period) 
Yes No No No 
D
at
a 
fe
at
ur
es
 Primary tax data No Yes No Yes 
Data extrapolation 
possible 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
                                                            
2 Development of a System of Indicators on Competitiveness and Fiscal Impact on Enterprises Performance 
(DIECOFIS). 
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The corporate microsimulation approach employed by the Canadian ministry of finance3 
complements a macroeconomic model called CEFM.4 It is based on a representative dataset 
covering 18,000 corporations. The micro data is directly assembled from tax returns plus ad-
ditional information taken from the financial accounts. The CEFM framework does not only 
serve the purpose of pure policy analysis but is also conceived to fulfill a revenue forecasting 
function. Therefore, the database is updated or extrapolated to the current period. Moreover, 
the model is capable of capturing tax base regulations as well as certain inter-temporal effects 
of tax legislation. 
 
In 2007, the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) presented a microsimulation 
model (BizTax) designed particularly to evaluate the German business tax reform 2008 (Bach 
et al. (2008)). It is based on a representative dataset sampled from official individual local 
business tax and income tax files for 2001. Individual firm structures and tax bases computed 
on the basis of the primary data are extrapolated to the year 2008 by means of - inter alia - 
yearly turnover tax statistics.5 Despite the far-reaching data update, BizTax keeps in principle 
a one-periodic perspective in its analyses. Inter-temporal aspects of taxation hence might not 
be fully reflected in the computations. Moreover, BizTax does not precisely simulate the defi-
nition of the tax base. Instead, changing regulation with respect to the ascertainment of profits 
thus is taken account of via imposed proportional adjustments of benchmark profits. Howev-
er, BizTax has been successfully employed for the evaluation of selected issues subject to the 
business tax reform 2008 (Fossen and Bach (2008)).  
 
The design of the ZEW TaxCoMM has in part been inspired by these existing approaches. 
However, offering broad analytical capacities within a multi-periodic framework, the new 
model goes beyond prior approaches and thus closes a gap in the conceptual design of corpo-
rate microsimulation models. Precisely, ZEW TaxCoMM is the first microsimulation model 
which allows for a detailed assessment of all major elements forming the tax bases for profit 
taxes including e.g. depreciation, thin capitalization rules and loss offset as well as tax regula-
tions concerning different types of provisions.  
 
 
                                                            
3 No primary documentation is available for this model. The following précis therefore is based on Ahmet 
(2006).  
4 CEFM: Canadian Economic and Fiscal Model. 
5 The BizTax model may even resort to a long-term projection up to the year 2015 (Bach et al. (2008)).  
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3 The ZEW TaxCoMM: A new Corporate Microsimulation Approach  
ZEW TaxCoMM establishes an explicit linkage between the corporate financial accounting 
sphere and the tax accounting sphere. The principal data input is taken from the DAFNE da-
tabase provided by Bureau van Dijk. DAFNE contains detailed financial information of Ger-
man corporations. Precisely, our microsimulation database covers the years from 2003-2005. 
We expect that the 2008 reform did not affect business behaviour during this period. The pub-
lic debate only started at the end of the year 2006. The data excluded from DAFNE thus 
should not reflect any (anticipated) reform consequences. The microsimulation procedure re-
quires the underlying data panel to be balanced. Hence, only corporations with balance sheets 
as well as profit and loss accounts for this entire time span are included in the sample.6 Fi-
nally, the sample encompasses 12,569 companies and 37,707 firm-year observations  
 
Table 2: Number of companies in the sample classified according to economic activity 
and size  
Economic Activity Small Corporations Medium-sized Corporations 
Large 
Corporations 
Mining and Manufacturing 1,210 730 997 
Energy and Water Supply 44 70 377 
Construction 1,159 220 90 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants 1,574 620 505 
Transportation and Telecommunications 401 140 195 
Other Services 2,330 766 1,141 
    
All economic activities  6,718 2,546 3,305 
Share of companies in size range 53.45% 20.26% 26.29% 
Note: The table shows absolute numbers of corporations considered by ZEW TaxCoMM classified by company size and economic 
activity. Proportions of company size ranges are displayed in the bottom row. Company size is defined according to annual balance 
sheet totals. Small corporations display an annual balance sheet total of not more than € 4,015,000. Corporations are classified as 
medium-sized if the annual balance sheet total ranges between € 4,015,000 and € 16,060,000. The balance sheet total of large 
corporations exceeds € 16,060,000.  
 
Table 2 illustrates the structure of the sample with regard to size and economic activity. The sam-
ple covers small, medium-sized and large corporations operating in six different economic 
sectors. In order to smooth out structural differences between the microsimulation sample and 
the population of all corporations in Germany, data and results from the considered sample 
are extrapolated. For this purpose, we principally proceed along the lines of the method ap-
plied by the Deutsche Bundesbank to extrapolate financial accounts data from a sample of 
German corporations to the total business population. However, while Deutsche Bank resorts 
to official turnover statistics, the extrapolation here is based on the corporate income tax sta-
tistic of 2004 provided by the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 
                                                            
6  Non-tax-paying charitable companies are excluded from the dataset.  
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(2009)).7 It provides only moderately aggregated information based on a virtually complete 
survey of tax declarations from corporations. The statistic inter alia reports the number of cor-
porations falling into predefined income ranges and the aggregate gross taxable corporate in-
come earned from corporations within each range. The data are grouped according to eco-
nomic sectors and according to profit and loss making corporations. Due to its full coverage 
of corporations and its reference to gross taxable corporate income which is a key output vari-
able in the ZEW TaxCoMM, the corporate income tax statistic is well suited to extrapolate the 
results from the considered sample. Precisely, we proceed as follows. First, for each economic 
activity, the corporations in the ZEW TaxCoMM sample are grouped into intervals of gross 
taxable corporate income corresponding to those defined in the corporate income tax statistic. 
Second, for each resulting activity-income-class, we calculate the proportion of the class-
specific number of sample observations to population observations in that same class, as giv-
en by the corporate income tax statistic. Third, sample observations in each activity-income-
cluster are weighted by the reciprocal of this proportion.8 The weights for extrapolation are 
determined annually. Thus, firms might switch income classes over the considered years. For 
each year, however, the sample data is aligned to the total business population as represented 
by the corporate income tax statistic of 2004. The extrapolation ensures that structural distor-
tions of the sample due to less prominently represented small and medium-sized corporations 
or underrepresented sectors are offset. Hence ZEW TaxCoMM allows conclusions on the dis-
tribution of the tax burden among corporations as well as on revenue implications of tax re-
forms. Table 3 illustrates the structure of the extrapolated sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7  The Federal Statistical Office has provided us with a special evaluation of the corporate income tax statistic. 
It contains tabulations in much higher detail than those in the standard version. 
8  The procedure thus implicitly assumes that within each activity-income-class, the ratio between gross 
corporate taxable income and individual balance sheet or profit and loss account items of firms not included 
in the sample on average corresponds to that of corporations covered by the dataset.  
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Table 3: Number of companies in the extrapolated sample classified according to eco-
nomic activity and size (3-year average) 
Economic Activity Small Corporations 
Medium-sized 
Corporations 
Large 
Corporations 
Mining and Manufacturing 84,341 17,580 8,800 
Energy and Water Supply 3,829 1,393 2,194 
Construction 81,781 6,359 844 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants 150,463 20,103 6,507 
Transportation and Telecommunications 24,807 2,212 1,267 
Other Services 349,021 32,236 23,112 
    
All economic activities  694,242 79,882 42,723 
Share of companies in size range 84.99% 9.78% 5.23% 
Note: The table shows absolute numbers of corporations considered by ZEW TaxCoMM after extrapolation on the basis of the 
corporate income tax statistic of 2004. Proportions of company size ranges are displayed in the bottom row. Company size is defined 
according to annual balance sheet totals. Small corporations display an annual balance sheet total of not more than € 4,015,000. 
Corporations are classified as medium-sized if the annual balance sheet total ranges between € 4,015,000 and € 16,060,000. The 
balance sheet total of large corporations exceeds € 16,060,000.  
 
Due to the panel structure of the exploited financial accounts data, ZEW TaxCoMM is able to 
take the intertemporal effects of tax provisions into account. In this regard it thus contrasts 
with other microsimulation models which resort to mainly cross-sectional tax data as principal 
source of information. Furthermore, ZEW TaxCoMM is capable of tracing the consequences 
of changes in tax provisions in high detail, since it derives flow data from financial stock data 
and thereby allows a detailed simulation of firm specific tax assessment. Precisely, all rele-
vant tax data is computed “bottom-up” on the basis of financial accounts and not exogenously 
taken as input from other primary sources.  
As a central link between both the financial accounting and the tax accounting sphere, ZEW 
TaxCoMM uses the profit on ordinary activities as defined in § 275 II No 14/ III No 13 CC 
(Commercial Code). In a first stage, the model, therefore, comprises a sequence of modules 
which determine required modifications of variables for each firm separately. These modifica-
tions account for deviations of financial accounting schemes from corresponding tax account-
ing regulations and practices for both corporate tax as well as trade tax purposes. While the 
relevant modules may vary with respect to their computational complexity and the technical 
approach chosen, they all are conceived along the lines of four essential notions: 
• Exploit and never contradict all available information from financial statements 
• Consistently trace firm-level developments over time 
• Opt for the most realistic assumption with regard to firm-level choices, even if it is not 
in line with tax-minimizing behaviour 
• Modules must easily adapt to different tax regulations and reform scenarios  
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In a second stage of the microsimulation procedure, the identified required modifications are 
applied to the profit on ordinary activities for each firm separately. Table 4 summarizes these 
potential modifications. 9  
 
Table 4: Potential modifications of the profit of ordinary activity for tax purposes 
Depreciation (Goodwill, intangible fixed assets, other immovable fixed assets, movable fixed 
assets) 
Provisions (Other Provisions) 
Creditors (Long-Term Trade Creditors) 
Special Capitalised Expenses 
Interest Deduction Limitations 
Dividend Tax Exemption  
Investment Grants and Subsidies 
Non-Deductible Expenses 
Add-back & Deductions for Trade Tax 
Integrated Fiscal Units 
Fiscal Loss Carryforward  
Contributions from foreign permanent establishments 
 
ZEW TaxCoMM then calculates the firm-specific tax due by applying the respective tax rates 
to the computed scenario- and firm-specific tax bases for corporate income tax and trade tax 
purposes. Since total amounts of tax due are not comparable across companies, ZEW Tax-
CoMM computes an effective tax burden measure particularly suitable for microsimulation 
purposes. 
By definition, the employed effective tax rate measures the relative wedge between pre-tax 
and post-tax values of a given target variable. A target variable which can be easily extracted 
from financial accounts data is the future value of periodical pre-tax cash flow10 ( CFFV ). To 
generate the post-tax value of this variable ( CFFVτ ), periodic pre-tax cash flow ( tCF ) are re-
duced by profit taxes (τ ) and accumulated according to the time horizon (T ). Hence, the 
ZEW TaxCoMM effective tax burden on cash flow is defined as 
                                                            
9  For a concise explanation of the principles and technicalities of the German tax and business law, see Wolff 
et al. (2005). For a more detailed description of ZEW TaxCoMM see Reister et al. (2008). 
10  The periodic cash flow used follows the definition of the Society of Investment Professionals in Germany 
(Schmalenbach Association). It is reduced by cash flow arising from tax-exempt foreign income. 
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The (unique) interest rate ( i ) used to calculate the future value of cash flow is the average 
yield of German industrial securities in the period of 2003 to 2005 which amounts to 4.2%. 
While this (gross) interest rate is directly applied to compute future values of pre-tax cash 
flow, a net interest rate ( iτ ) is needed for the calculation of respective post-tax cash flow fu-
ture values.  
Conceptually, the approach chosen here combines a forward-looking perspective with a 
backward-looking foundation. It is backward-looking in that it resorts to historic real data in-
stead of relying on hypothetic investments but forward-looking since the impact of tax re-
forms on an important investor’s target variable can be simulated endogenously.  
 
Validating ZEW TaxCoMM 
Validating ZEW TaxCoMM is not an easy task since tax statistics do not report disaggregated 
data on firm specific tax due. Yet, as regards the validation at firm level, ZEW TaxCoMM’s 
capability to consistently approximate tax bases and hence, resulting corporate income and 
trade taxes due can be evaluated on the basis of information about taxes paid on income in-
cluded in the ZEW TaxCoMM data sample taken from the DAFNE database for the corres-
ponding years 2003 to 2005. However, this is a relatively rough approach since the financial 
accounting item “taxes on profit” reflects tax prepayments, tax refunds and deferred taxes 
within a reporting period. Thus, it might significantly deviate from the tax due for that spe-
cific period. However, for companies with relatively stable profits over time, both variables 
should be rather close. Therefore, validation of the ZEW TaxCoMM will rely on comparing 
computed taxes due with taxes paid on profits for this type of companies. In total, 129 com-
panies belong to this group of firms with a very smooth profit dynamic (+/- 5% over all three 
years considered). Looking at the relative gap between the simulated tax due and financial 
“taxes on profit”, the corresponding mean relative deviation for all 387 observations amounts 
to 2.0% if outlying results (below respectively higher than 1st and 99th percentiles) are elimi-
nated. We conclude that there is no considerable systematic deviation of the ZEW TaxCoMM 
microsimulation results from underlying “real” taxes due. 
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That the gross taxable income is very realistically simulated is also confirmed in course of the 
extrapolation of the dataset. In this context, the intervals of gross taxable corporate income for 
which the Federal Statistical office refuses to report the number of firms11 match with those 
intervals to which we allocate only a few firms on the basis of ZEW TaxCoMM. This would 
not be the case if ZEW TaxCoMM would systematically over- or underestimate the actual in-
come.  
 
 
 
4 Assessing the 2008 German Corporate Tax Reform from a Micro-Perspective 
 
4.1 Regulatory changes in detail 
The consequences of the German corporate tax reform 2008 are still at the heart of an ongoing 
academic and political debate. The reform followed a persistent international trend of cutting 
tax rates and financing these tax rate cuts by broadening the tax base. In order to broaden the 
tax base, countries increasingly tend to detach the corporate income tax base from profits by 
including non-deductible business expenses. Prominent examples are thin-capitalisation or 
earning-stripping rules that aim at limiting debt financing within group structures. An even 
broader concept of restricting the deductibility of interest expenses applies for instance in 
Denmark, Italy and since the 2008 reform also in Germany. In these countries, the non-
deductible interest expenses not only capture interest on shareholder loans, but regulations re-
strict the deductibility for all interest expenses in excess of a predefined ratio of total assets or 
EBITDA. Besides interest expenses, the use of losses is often restricted as well. As regards 
local taxes on corporations, they are either directly based on capital instead of profits (e.g. 
“taxe professionnelle” in France) or apply to a tax base that taxes also business expenses (e.g. 
interest add-backs for trade tax in Germany and interest as well as labour cost add-backs for 
“IRAP” in Italy). To sum up, the German tax reform follows a distinct and internationally 
prevalent pattern that is not unique to the German tax system. Hence, its evaluation also pro-
vides valuable insights into the general implications of tax rate cut cum base broadening re-
forms on heterogeneous firms. The regulatory changes underlying the analysis will be 
sketched in the following.  
 
                                                            
11  For some intervals covering the highest positive or negative gross taxable income, the Federal Statistical 
Office only reports the aggregate income but not the number of firms in this interval, since it would 
otherwise be possible to conclude on the identity of the respective firms.  
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The German tax law as of the year 2007 constitutes the reference tax system which serves as 
the natural benchmark to assess the reform-induced changes in firm-level effective tax bur-
dens.12 Table 5 juxtaposes the basic elements of the reference tax system 2007 and the corres-
ponding major changes in tax regulations implemented in the course of the corporate tax 
reform. Table 5 shows that the 2008 reform is characterized by broadening the profit tax bases 
(abolishment of declining balance depreciation, additional restrictions concerning loss offset, 
stronger limitations of interest deductibility) accompanied by a reduction of profit tax rates 
(corporate income tax rate is reduced from 25% to 15%, trade tax rate from 16.67% to 14% if 
an average municipal multiplier of 400% is assumed).  
 
Table 5: Regulations concerning German taxes on profits before and after the 2008 cor-
porate tax reform  
Tax Year 2007 Tax Year 2008 
Taxes on profits: 
 - corporate income tax (“Körperschaftsteuer”)  
  - solidarity surcharge (“Solidaritätszuschlag”)          
- trade tax (“Gewerbesteuer”) 
Taxes on profits: 
 - corporate income tax (“Körperschaftsteuer”)  
  - solidarity surcharge (“Solidaritätszuschlag”)                
- trade tax (“Gewerbesteuer”) 
 
 
Tax bases: Tax bases: 
Corporate income tax: 
- trade tax is deductible 
- depreciation: generally straight-line method is 
applied, declining balance depreciation at a 
rate of 30% is possible for movable property 
(§ 7 ITA) 
- exemption (95%) of dividend income 
according to § 8b CTA 
- loss carry back (limitation: € 511,500)  to the 
previous year and loss carry forward (€ 
1,000,000 without limitation, exceeding 
amounts to 60%) are possible (§ 10d ITA) 
- losses can generally only be set off against 
positive income if legal and economic identity 
of a corporation is maintained (§ 8 IV CTA) 
- limitation of the deductibility of interests 
resulting from debt financing only for 
shareholders loans (§ 8a CTA) 
Corporate income tax: 
- trade tax is no longer deductible (§ 4 IV ITA) 
- depreciation: generally straight-line method is 
applied, declining balance depreciation is 
abolished (§7 ITA) 
- exemption (95%) of dividend income according to 
§ 8b CTA 
- loss carry back (limitation: € 511,500) and loss 
carry forward (€ 1,000,000  without limitation, 
exceeding amounts to 60%) are possible (§ 10d 
ITA) 
- losses can generally only be set off against 
positive income if there are no substantial changes 
in shareholder structure (proportional  loss offset 
if 25% to 50% of shareholder change, no loss 
offset if more than 50% of shareholder change, § 
8c CTA) 
- general limitation of the deductibility of interests 
resulting from debt financing to 30% of tax 
EBITDA with an exemption limit of € 1,000,000 
and the possibility of an interest carry forward (§ 
8a CTA, § 4h ITA, “Zinsschranke”) 
Solidarity surcharge: 
 
-        levied on corporate income tax due (§ 3 
Solidarity Surcharge Act)  
Solidarity surcharge: 
 
- levied on corporate income tax due  (§ 3 Solidarity 
Surcharge Act)  
 
Trade tax: Trade tax: 
                                                            
12  For details concerning the calculation of corporate taxable income in Germany see Endres/Oestreicher/ 
Scheffler/Spengel (2007). 
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- corporate taxable income is used as a starting 
point and modified by certain adjustments (§ 7 
TTA) 
- exemption (95%) of dividend income  
according to § 9 TTA only for dividends 
resulting from an amount of holding of at least 
10% (“gewerbesteuerliches 
Schachtelprivileg”)  
- only loss carry forward (€ 1,000,000  without 
limitation, exceeding amounts to 60%) 
possible (§ 10a TTA) 
- losses can generally only be set off against 
positive income if legal and economic identity 
of a corporation is maintained (§ 10a TTA, § 8 
IV CTA) 
- addition of 50% of interest expenditures 
resulting from long-term loans (no exemption 
limit granted, § 8 TTA) 
 
- corporate taxable income is used as a starting 
point and modified by certain adjustments (§ 7 
TTA) 
- exemption (95%) of dividend income according to 
§ 9 TTA only for dividends resulting from an 
amount of holding of at least 15% 
(“gewerbesteuerliches Schachtelprivileg”)  
- only loss carry forward (€ 1,000,000  without 
limitation, exceeding amounts to 60%) possible (§ 
10a TTA) 
- losses can generally only be set off against 
positive income if there are no substantial changes 
in shareholder structure (proportional  loss offset 
if 25% to 50% of shareholder change, no loss 
offset if more than 50% of shareholder change, § 
10a TTA, § 8c CTA) 
- addition of 25% of all interest expenditures as 
well as parts of rental, lease and licence fees 
deemed to be interest expenditures (exemption 
limit: € 100,000, § 8 TTA) 
  
Tax rates: 
 
- corporate income tax: 25% (§ 23 CTA) 
- solidarity surcharge: 5.5% (§ 4 Solidarity 
Surcharge Act) 
- trade tax: varying municipal rates (minimum 
200%, at average about 400%) and a 
multiplier of 5% (§§ 11, 16 TTA) 
Tax rates: 
 
- corporate income tax: 15% (§ 23 CTA) 
- solidarity surcharge: 5.5% (§ 4 Solidarity 
Surcharge Act) 
- trade tax: varying municipal rates (minimum   
         200%, at average about 400%) and a multiplier   
         of 3.5% (§§ 11, 16 TTA) 
Source: Own compilation. 
The central aims of the corporate tax reform as declared by the German federal government 
were the improvement of Germany’s location attractiveness from a tax perspective, by cutting 
profit tax rates and the enhancement of tax neutrality with respect to the choice of legal form 
as well as financing decisions (Bundestag (2007)). Furthermore, companies as well as local 
and federal governments should benefit from an improved planning reliability. After all, a ma-
jor focus of the entire reform has been put on the sustained strengthening of the German tax 
base. As a consequence, revenue neutrality played a major role in the design of the reform.  
 
4.2. Implications of the German Corporate Tax Reform on the Distribution of the Tax 
Burden Across Firms 
As a primary output, ZEW TaxCoMM calculates the annual tax due at the level of each firm. 
To gain insight in the distribution of the tax burden across companies of different sizes and 
economic activity, the following analysis is based on the effective tax burden on cash flow 
(Table 6). The effective tax burden on cash flow, as shown in Section 3, represents the tax in-
duced relative cut of the future value of periodical pre-tax cash flow.13 
                                                            
13  Implausible values have been eliminated by applying the Median Absolute Deviation Method (MAD) with a 
tolerance interval of 20xMAD. This procedure removed 142 firms from the dataset. 
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In the reference tax system 2007, the average effective tax burden on cash flow across all 
economic activities amounts to 26.38% for small corporations, 19.41% for medium-sized cor-
porations and 19.21% for large corporations. Furthermore, Table 6 reveals a considerable 
variation of the average effective tax burden on cash flow across company size and economic 
activity. By definition, the effective tax burden on cash flow is driven by the annual tax due as 
well as annual cash flow. While it declines ceteris paribus with rising cash flow, it increases 
ceteris paribus with rising annual taxes due. Under the tax regime of 2007, the effective tax 
burden on cash flow ranges from an average of 9.56% for medium-sized corporations in the 
energy sector to 29.87% for small corporations in the service sector. 
 
Table 6: ZEW TaxCoMM average effective tax burden on cash flow (in %) for reference 
and reform tax system and deviation between the two systems (in percentage points) 
 
 
Small Corporations 
 
 
Medium-Sized Corporations 
 
 
Large Corporations 
 
Economic Activity 2007 2008 ∆ 2007 2008 ∆ 2007 2008 ∆ 
 
Mining, 
Manufacturing 22.23% 17.22% -5.01 19.08% 14.70% -4.39 18.33% 14.78% -3.55 
 
Energy, Water 
Supply 12.13% 9.96% -2.17 9.56% 7.86% -1.70 7.78% 6.64% -1.15 
 
Construction 23.80% 18.53% -5.27 21.60% 16.51% -5.09 15.43% 12.53% -2.91 
 
Trade, Hotels, 
Restaurants 22.85% 17.44% -5.41 17.97% 13.95% -4.01 20.14% 16.60% -3.54 
 
Transportation, 
Telecommunication 23.54% 18.61% -4.93 14.91% 12.63% -2.28 15.03% 12.19% -2.84 
 
Other Services, 
Activities 29.87% 23.15% -6.73 20.79% 15.56% -5.23 20.74% 18.29% -2.45 
 
All economic 
activities  26.38% 20.41% -5.97 19.41% 14.83% -4.59 19.21% 16.42% -2.80 
Note: This table shows the ZEW TaxCoMM effective tax burden on cash flow in % and its reform induced changes in percentage 
points for different company sizes and economic activities, on average. The results are based on the extrapolated sample. The 
effective tax burden on cash flow represents the tax induced relative cut of the future value of periodical pre-tax cash flow. 
Implausible values have been eliminated by applying the Median Absolute Deviation Method (MAD) with a tolerance interval of 
20xMAD. This procedure removed 142 firms from the dataset. Company size categories are defined as explained in footnote of 
Table 2. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
 
After the corporate tax reform of 2008, the effective tax burden on cash flow varies between 
7.86% for medium-sized corporations in the energy sector and 23.15% for small corporations 
in the service sector. The average decline in the tax burden is highest for small corporations 
(5.97 percentage points) and lowest for large corporations (2.80 percentage points). The re-
duction of the tax burden for large corporations is comparably low since large corporations 
are to a greater extend subject to newly implemented interest deduction ceiling regulations 
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and extended interest add-backs. The average share of corporations underlying the interest 
deduction ceiling regulation, for instance, amounts to 6.73% for large corporations as opposed 
to virtually 0% for small corporations and 0.11% for medium-sized corporations.  
Table 7 illustrates in detail how the reduction in the effective tax burden is distributed within 
the sample. 
 
Table 7: Distribution of the reduction in the effective tax burden on cash flow (in per-
centage points)  
Percentile 1% 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% 
Reduction of effective tax burden in 
percentage points -3.31 0.04 0.30 1.13 5.28 8.40 9.86 13.37 32.17 
Note: This table displays the distribution of the reform induced reduction in the effective tax burden on cash flow in percentage 
points. The results are based on the extrapolated sample. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM  
 
25% of the corporations in the sample experience a decrease in the effective tax burden on 
cash flow of less than 1.13 percentage points. However, under 2008 tax law, less than 5% of 
all corporations in the microsimulation sample are subject to an increased effective tax burden 
on their cash flow. Moreover, the reduction ranges between 1.13 and 8.40 percentage points 
for 50% of the corporations. Only 10% of the corporations see their effective tax burden on 
cash flow to be reduced by more than 9.86 percentage points. The elements of the corporate 
tax reform 2008, which broaden the tax base, mitigate the effect of the tax rate cut on the ef-
fective tax burden on cash flow. Regulations of the corporate tax reform 2008 that broaden the 
tax base are, for instance, the abolition of the deductibility of trade tax for corporate tax pur-
poses, the abolition of the declining balance method and extended restrictions governing the 
deduction of interest expenses. In this context, the modified regulations governing add-backs 
of interest expenses for trade tax purposes might have ambiguous effects on companies of dif-
ferent structure. In case of mostly small and medium-sized corporations with low interest ex-
penses, the newly introduced allowance of € 100,000 in interest deduction can translate to an 
absolute relief compared to the reference tax system.  
 
The extent to which tax rate cuts translate into a decrease in the effective tax burden is closely 
related to the profitability of the corporation.14 In contrast, structural ratios such as debt ratio 
                                                            
14 The financial ratios referred to in this analysis are defined as follows: The profitability of a corporation is 
defined as the 3-year average ratio of annual profit of ordinary activity to annual balance sheet total. The 3-
year average ratio of interest-bearing liabilities to annual balance sheet total yields the debt ratio. The capital 
intensity is given by the 3-year average ratio of tangible fixed assets to annual balance sheet total. 
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and capital intensity indicate the exposure of corporations to elements of the reform which 
broaden the tax base. Therefore, companies of high profitability, low debt ratio and low capi-
tal intensity are largely expected to gain most from the reform. By capturing the heterogeneity 
of firms, ZEW TaxCoMM can very precisely illustrate this issue. Table 8 matches the reduc-
tion in the effective tax burden on cash flow with the relevant financial ratios of the corpora-
tions in the sample. Precisely, the reduction in the tax burden is separated into quarters, the 
boundaries of which are defined by the quartiles given in Table 7. For each quarter, Table 8 
shows the corresponding median of financial ratios across those companies contained in that 
respective quarter. 
 
Table 8: Matching up effective tax burdens on cash flow with financial ratios 
Reduction in effective 
tax burden Financial Ratio 
Median of Financial 
Ratio 
Standard Deviation of 
Financial Ratio 
 
1st quarter  
Profitability 
-1.29% 30.78% 
2nd quarter 1.66% 12.68% 
3rd quarter 5.86% 23.79% 
4th quarter 5.41% 29.70% 
    
 
1st quarter 
Debt Ratio 
48.26% 28.20% 
2nd quarter 41.11% 24.35% 
3rd quarter 34.59% 24.63% 
4th quarter 28.98% 28.85% 
    
 
1st quarter 
Capital Intensity 
20.59% 28.34% 
2nd quarter 16.93% 23.84% 
3rd quarter 11.16% 18.84% 
4th quarter 7.08% 18.37% 
Note: This table shows for each quarter of the reduction in effective tax burden on cash flow the 
corresponding median of profitability, debt ratio and capital intensity across companies contained in the 
respective quarter. The results are based upon the extrapolated sample.  The boundaries of the quarters are 
defined by the quartiles of the distribution given in Table 7. Profitability is defined as the 3-year average 
ratio of annual profit of ordinary activity to annual balance sheet total. The 3-year average ratio of 
interest-bearing liabilities to annual balance sheet total yields the debt ratio. The capital intensity is given 
by the 3-year average ratio of tangible fixed assets to annual balance sheet total. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
 
ZEW TaxCoMM shows that corporations falling into the lowest quarter of the reduction in 
the effective tax burden are indeed of low profitability, largely debt financed and show a high 
capital intensity. Hence, while these corporations benefit from tax rate cuts to a comparably 
smaller extent, their tax burden is hit particularly hard by extended interest add-backs, the in-
terest deduction ceiling regulations and the abolition of the declining balance depreciation. 
Vice versa, the decline in the effective average tax burden is most accentuated for highly prof-
itable corporations with a low debt ratio and low capital intensity. Corporations falling into 
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the third or forth quarter, i.e. experiencing a reduction in the effective tax burden of more than 
5.28 percentage points, are of a similarly high profitability. Yet, the 25% of corporations that 
benefit most from the corporate tax reform feature, in addition to the high profitability, a con-
siderably lower debt ratio and a lower capital intensity.  
 
Table 7 clearly indicated that a vast majority of corporations experiences a decline in the ef-
fective tax burden on cash flow. Table 8 matched the degree of reduction in effective tax bur-
den up with corresponding financial ratios. Table 9 takes a complementary look at the distri-
bution of winners and losers across company sizes and economic activities.  
 
 
Table 9: Share of “winners” and “losers” of the reform 2008  
 Small Corporations Medium-Sized Corporations Large Corporations 
Economic Activity "Winner"  "Loser" "Winner"  "Loser" "Winner"  "Loser" 
 
Mining, 
Manufacturing 94.19%  5.53% 92.12%  7.88% 90.88%  9.12% 
 
Energy, Water Supply 77.32%  22.68% 80.45%  19.55% 73.68%  26.32% 
 
Construction 95.40%  4.60% 98.13%  1.87% 96.29%  3.71% 
 
Trade, Hotels,  
Restaurants 95.77%  4.00% 93.97%  6.03% 93.62%  6.38% 
 
Transportation, 
Telecommunications 92.02%  7.98% 73.69%  26.31% 94.25%  5.75% 
 
Other Services, 
Activities 97.66%  2.28% 96.93%  3.07% 88.06%  11.94% 
 
All economic 
activities  96.25%  3.64% 94.29%  5.71% 89.13%  10.87% 
Note: This table displays the share of companies according to company size and economic activity that are “winner” or “loser” of the 
corporate tax reform 2008. The results are based on the extrapolated sample. Company size categories are defined as in the footnote 
of Table 2. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM  
 
 
The share of “winners” ranges from 73.68% for large corporations in the energy sector to 
98.13% for medium-sized corporations in the construction sector. With regard to all economic 
activities, the highest share of “winners” can be stated for small corporations and the lowest 
share for large corporations. Despite the important tax rate cuts, there is still a distinct share of 
corporations that do not benefit from the tax reform but incur an increase in the effective tax 
burden on cash flow. This result holds true for each size range and economic activity.  
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Table 10 provides an insight in the determinants for being a “winner” or “loser” of the tax re-
form and strengthens the arguments brought forward to explain the differentials in tax burden 
reductions. High profitability, low debt ratio and low capital intensity favour a reduction in 
the tax burden and therefore characterise the “winner” of the reform. However, if companies 
face a lower profitability, rely heavily on debts and have a huge share of tangible fixed assets, 
they are more likely to lose with regard to the tax reform of 2008. These sector-specific indi-
cations are in line with the more general analysis in Table 8. 
 
Table 10: Average financial ratios of “winners” and “losers” of the reform 2008 
 Profitability Debt Ratio Capital Intensity 
Economic activity "Loser" "Winner" "Loser" "Winner" " Loser" "Winner" 
 
Mining, Manufacturing 0.89% 3.58% 53.14% 45.20% 31.56% 25.54% 
 
Energy, Water Supply 5.48% 5.56% 49.54% 41.01% 64.98% 66.84% 
 
Construction -1.04% 2.29% 51.44% 40.73% 22.32% 16.16% 
 
Trade, Hotels, Restaurants 0.46% 3.23% 46.62% 43.71% 21.01% 16.78% 
 
Transportation, 
Telecommunications 2.06% 2.29% 53.10% 46.02% 56.50% 31.40% 
 
Other Services, Activities 
 
-0.74% 3.11% 48.08% 37.00% 35.87% 25.37% 
All economic activities  0.09% 3.10% 49.63% 40.56% 33.41% 22.38% 
Note: The table displays the average financial ratios of “losers” and “winners” of the reform for different economic activities. The 
financial ratios are defined as in footnote of Table 8. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM  
 
 
4.3 Estimating the Effects of Firm Characteristics on the Reduction in the Effective Tax 
Burden  
Tables 8 and 10 provide some insights into the characteristics of firms and economic sectors 
that benefit to a higher or lower degree from the tax reform. However, it should be interesting 
to see the marginal effects of firm characteristics on the reform induced reduction in firm-
level effective tax rates. For this purpose, we run some straightforward regression analysis us-
ing ordinary least squares estimation (OLS).15 The baseline equation is indeed kept very sim-
ple as there should be only a few variables which have an impact on firm-level reform conse-
quences. We regress the reduction in the effective tax rate (Reduc) of firm i = 1,.. N  on the 
                                                            
15  The regression is run on a reduced dataset excluding observations with implausible values for the variables 
used in the analysis. Precisely, observations with reductions in the tax rate exceeding 100% have been 
deleted. Moreover, observations showing a profitability above 1000% or below -1000% respectively have 
been eliminated from the sample. Over-indebted companies have been excluded, as well. 
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profitability (ProfitR), the debt ratio (DebtR) and the capital intensity (CapR).16 The estima-
tion equation thus reads 
 0 1 2 3Reduc ProfitR DebtR CapRi i i i iuβ β β β= + + + +  
with iu as a residual. The extent to which tax rate cuts translate into a reduction in the effec-
tive tax rate is closely related to the profitability of the corporation. In contrast, the debt ratio 
and capital intensity indicate the exposure of corporations to elements of the reform which 
broaden the tax base. High debt ratios and capital intensities should thus come along with 
moderated reform induced reductions of tax levels. The respective financial ratios are taken 
from the financial accounts of the extrapolated dataset. Since the current version of ZEW 
TaxCoMM does not yet account for behavioural responses, it is clear that the financial ratios 
determine the reduction in the effective tax burden and that the causality is not reverse. The 
reduction in the effective tax rate on cash flow constitutes the difference between the effective 
tax rate as derived by ZEW TaxCoMM under the reference tax regime 2007 and the reform 
regime 2008. We run the regression on the extrapolated dataset to ensure that the marginal ef-
fects are derived from non-distorted data. 
 
The result from this estimation is given in column (1) of Table 11. As expected, the coeffi-
cient of profitability is positive. An increase in profitability by one percentage point would 
raise the reform induced reduction in the effective tax burden by 0.07 percentage points. The 
impact of the capital intensity is negative, since the tax reform abolished the declining balance 
depreciation. When controlling for industry fixed effects, the results remain unchanged (col-
umn (2) of Table 11).  
 
An additional specification accounts for the fact that the reform might hit firms differently ac-
cording to their size. Consequently, the effect of firm characteristics on the reduction of the 
tax burden might depend on the size of the firm. A dummy variable L is therefore introduced 
for large firms as well as an interaction of L with profitability, debt ratio and capital intensity. 
The results are shown in column (3) of Table 11. For large corporations, the increase of prof-
itability by one percentage point triggers an increase in the reduction of the tax burden of 0.09 
                                                            
16  The financial ratios referred to in this analysis are again defined as in the previous section: The profitability 
of a corporation is defined as the 3-year average ratio of annual profit of ordinary activity to annual balance 
sheet total. The 3-year average ratio of interest-bearing liabilities to annual balance sheet total yields the debt 
ratio. The capital intensity is given by the 3-year average ratio of tangible fixed assets to annual balance sheet 
total. 
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percentage points17 which is considerably higher compared to the baseline specification. For 
large corporations, an increase in profitability seems to pay off more in terms of reform in-
duced reduction in the effective tax burden. This might be the case because a higher profita-
bility and thus higher EBITDA potentially prevents firms from being captured by the interest 
deduction ceiling regulation or at least increases the amount of deductible interest expenses. 
 
Table 11: Effects of firm characteristics on the reduction in the effective tax burden 
Dependent Variable Reform induced reduction in the effective tax burden 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Profitability 0.0683*** 0.0687*** 0.0678*** 0.0687*** 
 (0.000890) (0.000893) (0.000838) (0.000853) 
Debt Ratio 0.00204*** 0.00224*** 0.00492*** 0.00579*** 
 (0.000260) (0.000263) (0.000224) (0.000220) 
Capital Intensity -0.0473*** -0.0462*** -0.0480*** -0.0468*** 
 (0.000249) (0.000266) (0.000232) (0.000211) 
     
L*Profitability   0.0225**  
   (0.0111)  
L*Debt Ratio   -0.0603***  
   (0.00271)  
L*Capital Intensity   0.0360***  
   (0.00162)  
L   -0.00746***  
   (0.000860)  
IDCR*Profitability    -0.0101 
    (0.0138) 
IDCR*Debt Ratio    -0.717*** 
    (0.0286) 
IDCR*Capital Intens    0.345*** 
    (0.0149) 
IDCR    0.108*** 
    (0.0111) 
     
Constant 0.0567*** 0.0540*** 0.0567*** 0.0557*** 
 (0.000104) (0.000149) (9.92e-05) (9.85e-05) 
Observations 1,737,176 1,737,176 1,737,176 1,737,176 
R2 0.046 0.048 0.054 0.098 
Note: This table displays the results of the OLS estimation. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* 
denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. The dummy variable DB indicates if the firm applied the declining 
balance depreciation prior to the reform. The dummy variable L designates firms that are classified as large 
corporations with total assets exceeding € 16,060,000. To identify firms which are subject to the newly 
introduced interest deduction ceiling regulation, the dummy variable IDCR is introduced. Specification (2) 
controls for industry fixed effects.  
 
The effect of the debt ratio turns out to be negative for large firms (-0.06) but positive, though 
very small, for small and medium-sized corporations (0.005). This result suggests that broa-
dening the tax base by restricting the deductibility of interest expenses hits large corporations 
                                                            
17  The coefficient of the interaction term yields the deviation between the partial impact for large corporations 
and for those companies not explicitly specified by a dummy variable (small and medium-sized 
corporations). Hence, the elasticity for large corporations is computed as 0.0678 + 0.0225 = 0.0903.  
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harder. An increase in debts relative to total assets is ceteris paribus related to a lower benefit 
from the tax reform in terms of reduction in the effective tax burden. The incidence of firms 
being subject to the interest deduction ceiling regulation is much smaller for small and me-
dium sized corporations due to the exemption threshold of € 1 million. Moreover, small firms 
might even benefit from the newly introduced exemption of up to € 100,000 of interest ex-
penses from add-backs for trade tax purposes thus explaining the slightly positive coefficient 
for the debt ratio. For larger firms, the exemption limit presumably does not outweigh the 
higher burden resulting from adding back 25% of all interest expenses instead of 50% of in-
terest on long term debt. The coefficient of capital intensity is -0.012 for large corporations 
and thus comparably low with respect to the other specifications. 
 
In an additional step, we distinguish between firms that are subject to the interest deduction 
ceiling regulation and those that are not. Therefore a dummy variable (IDCR) is introduced, 
indicating if a company is subject to this regulation. Again, interaction terms between IDCR 
and the financial ratios are included as well. Column (4) of Table 11 summarizes the result for 
this specification. Most remarkably, the coefficient of the debt ratio decreases to - 0.71 for 
companies subject to the considered regulation. Hence, at the condition that the interest de-
duction ceiling regulation applies, an increase of the debt ratio by one percentage point drives 
down the reduction in the effective tax burden by 0.71 percentage points. This effect is com-
parably strong since any additional interest expense is not tax deductible. The coefficient of 
profitability is positive since an increase in profitability and thus in EBITDA results ceteris 
paribus in a higher amount of deductible interest expenses.  
 
4.4 Revenue Consequences of the German Corporate Tax Reform 
To shed light on the reform induced changes in the tax revenue, ZEW TaxCoMM aggregates 
the firm specific tax due for each year. The results are displayed in Table 12. For the reference 
tax system 2007 the 3-year average tax revenue collected from corporations of all sizes 
amounts to € 49.762 billion (column 5). The respective contribution of trade tax to the total 
tax revenue amounts to € 22.709 billion (46% of the overall revenue). The corporate income 
generates tax revenue of € 25.642 billion (52% of the overall revenue). Comparing the 
contributions of companies of different sizes to the overall revenue (columns 2 - 4) reveals 
that large corporations pay 75% of the overall tax revenue, although they make up only 5% of 
all corporations considered.  
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With regard to the respective share of corporate income tax and trade tax in overall revenue, 
the results illustrate that the trade tax gains fiscally in importance in course of the reform. The 
tax rate cuts which have been considerably higher for the corporate income tax as compared 
to the trade tax mainly drive this result. At the same time, the trade tax is no longer deductible 
as a business expense, which adds to the increased effective weight of the trade tax burden.  
 
Table 12: Tax revenue in bn € for the reference tax system, the tax system of 2008 and 
change in % 
 3-year Average  
Tax system 
Small 
Corporations 
Medium-sized 
Corporations 
Large 
Corporations 
 
Total 
Reference tax system 2007     
Overall tax revenue (bn €) 6.326 6.215 37.221 49.762 
thereof trade tax 2.855 (45.1%) 2.836 (45.6%) 17.018 (45.7%) 22.709 (45.6%) 
Thereof corporate income tax 3.290 (52%) 3.202 (51.5%) 19.150 (51.5%) 25.642 (51.5%) 
Thereof solidarity surcharge 0.181 (2.9%) 0.176 (2.8%) 1.053 (2.8%) 1.467 (2.9%) 
     
Post-reform tax system 2008     
Overall tax-revenue (bn €) 4.929 4.832 30.185 39.945 
∆‐%  -22.08% -22.25% -18.90% -19.73% 
 
thereof trade tax 2.328 (47.2%) 2.276 (47.1%) 14.416 (47.8%) 19.021 (47.6%) 
∆‐%  -18.44% -19.74% -15.29% -16.24% 
 
thereof corporate income tax 2.465 (50%) 2.422 (50.1%) 14.947 (49.5%) 19.834 (50%) 
∆‐%  -25.08% -24.36% -21.95% -22.65% 
 
thereof solidarity surcharge 0.136 (2.8%) 0.133 (2.8%) 0.822 (2.7%) 1.091 (2.7%) 
∆‐%  -25.08% -24.36% -21.95% -22.65% 
Note: The table displays simulated tax revenues in billion € for the reference and reform tax system on the basis of the extrapolated 
sample and corresponding deviations in %. Tax revenue is calculated by aggregation of firm-level annual taxes due. Results are 
itemized according to the different taxes: Trade tax and corporate income tax plus solidarity surcharge. Company size categories are 
defined as explained in footnote of Table 2. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
 
In the short run, when disregarding behavioural responses to changes in the tax system, the 
corporate tax reform 2008 results in a decline in tax revenues. The deficiency as simulated by 
ZEW TaxCoMM amounts to a total of € 9.817 billion and splits up into a loss of € 5.808 bil-
lion from corporate income tax, a loss of € 3.688 billion from trade tax and a loss of € 0.376 
billion from the solidarity surcharge.  
 
It is reasonable to compare the revenue effects computed by ZEW TaxCoMM with the out-
comes of other approaches. Besides ZEW TaxCoMM, the Federal Ministry of Finance (Bun-
destag (2007)) as well as Bach et al. (2007) and Radulescu/Stimmelmayr (2010) provide es-
timates on how the reform affects tax revenues. The results put forward by Bach et al. (2007) 
rely on the BizTax model which primarily determines the impact of tax rate cuts and trade tax 
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regulations on tax revenues.18 Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2010) analyse the 2008 reform on 
the basis of a dynamic computable general equilibrium model (IfoMod). Due to fundamental 
differences in the model setup as regards e.g. the data basis, the modeling of institutional de-
tails as well as the consideration of behavioural responses and interactions between sectors, 
the results of IfoMod and ZEW TaxCoMM are, however, hardly comparable. To sum up, the 
comparison with the estimates of the Federal Ministry of Finance turns out to be most viable 
and is therefore illustrated in Table 13.  
 
Table 13: Revenue Effects in bn € as estimated by the government and comparison to 
ZEW TaxCoMM results 
 Corporate Income Tax Trade Tax Solidarity Surcharge Overall 
     
ZEW Tax CoMM -5.808 -3.688 -0.367 -9.817 
     
Federal Ministry of Finance1 -6.150 -3.967 -0.585 -10.701
     
Deviation 0.342 0.279 0.218 0.884 
Note: The table displays the revenue effects of the corporate tax reform as proposed by the Federal Ministry of Finance and as 
derived by ZEW TaxCoMM. These figures refer to income collected from corporations.  
1The revenue effects estimated by the Federal Ministry are displayed net of those revenue gains the Ministry presumes to earn from 
the self-financing effect of the reform and from special restrictions on tax avoidance (e.g. relocation of functions, security lending). 
Source: ZEW TaxCoMM and Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundestag (2007)). 
 
According to the Federal Ministry of Finance, the presumed financing gap of the corporate tax 
reform totals € 10.701 billion.19 For comparison, the revenue loss computed by ZEW Tax-
CoMM is € 9.817 billion and thus about € 900 million lower. This deviation does not seem 
implausibly high. ZEW TaxCoMM simulates the considered tax base regulations more pre-
cisely at micro level and thus derives revenue gains from the broadening of the tax base that 
outweigh the effect from the tax rate cut to a larger extent.  
 
 
5 Implications for Reforming Corporate Taxation in Germany and Other Countries 
By establishing a relation between firm characteristics and the impact of the corporate tax 
reform 2008, the analysis in Section 4.2 and 4.3 provided evidence that companies losing 
from the reform feature a low profitability, a high debt ratio and a high capital intensity. 
About 5% of all corporations can be deemed to be loosing from the reform. While these firms 
benefit less from the tax rate cut, they are more heavily exposed to the tax base broadening 
                                                            
18  As opposed to the ZEW TaxCoMM, the BizTax model does not precisely simulate tax base regulations.  
19  These are deficiencies in revenue collected from corporations. The share of trade tax collected from 
corporations is approximated with 55% of total trade tax. The share of solidarity surcharge on corporate 
income is approximated with 11% of total solidarity surcharge revenue. The displayed loss is net of those 
revenue gains the Ministry presumes to earn from the self-financing effect of the reform and from special 
restrictions on tax avoidance (e.g. relocation of functions, security lending) (Bundestag (2007) p. 39).  
23 
 
regulations which finance the tax rate cuts. In two regards, this result bears high relevance in 
view of the current economic crisis. On the one hand, the number of losers will presumably 
rise. On the other hand, by causing earnings and investments to plummet while the cost of fi-
nancing soars, the economic crisis hits the losers of the reform especially hard. While the in-
crease in demand and costs of debt financing raises the overall amount of interest expenses, 
the decrease in profitability and EBITDA lowers the amount of interest expenses that is de-
ductible for tax purposes. Moreover, higher interest expenses increase the tax burden from in-
terest add-backs for trade tax purposes. Hence, the losers of the reform see their tax burden 
increase even more as compared to the pre-reform tax regime. Based on the regression results, 
the base line specification (column (1) of Table 11) suggests that if the profitability decreases 
by 20 percentage points, the reduction in the effective tax burden is reduced by 1.2 percentage 
points. It is even reduced by 1.8 percentage points for large corporations. If companies have 
to rely more heavily on debt financing due to liquidity constraints, an increase in the debt ratio 
of 20% reduces the benefit of the tax reform by 1.2 percentage points for large corporations 
and by 10.4 percentage points for companies already subject to the interest deduction ceiling 
regulation. 
 
Consequently, by taxing an increasing amount of non-deductible expenses, the tax reform im-
poses additional restrictions on the liquidity of corporations thus reinforcing the negative im-
plications of the crises on the financial situation of corporations. While this situation causes 
massive need for company restructuring, the very same is constrained by the regulation that 
bans loss set off when substantial changes in shareholder occur. To sum up, a tax rate cut cum 
base broadening reform especially when detaching the tax base from profits by banning the 
deduction of business expenses, additionally endangers the existence of firms in times of mas-
sive economic downturn. This finding has been exemplarily illustrated for the German corpo-
rate tax reform 2008, but similar consequences can be stated for other countries with compa-
rable patterns of corporate taxation.  
 
The governments of these countries now took measures to relieve companies from an addi-
tional tax burden in times of drastic economic downturn. These measures mainly focus on 
regulations considered as harmful in times of economic crisis, i.e. regulations that detach the 
tax base from profits. To name some examples, France intents to abolish the regional non-
profit tax “taxe professionnelle” as of January 1st 2010, and Italy will introduce some reliefs 
to its interest deduction ceiling regulation in terms of an EBITDA carry forward. The most 
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important modifications planned or already implemented by the German government are 
roughly sketched in the following. 
 
As regards the interest deduction ceiling regulation, the exemption limit has been raised from 
€ one million to € three million (§ 4h II 1 a ITA)20. Moreover, the government intends to mi-
tigate the pro-cyclical effects of this regulation by introducing an EBITDA carry forward as 
of 2010. If interest expenses to be deducted for tax purposes are below 30% of EBITDA and 
no exemption or escape clause is used, it should be possible to carry forward the balance (§ 4h 
I ITA)21. An EBITDA carry forward thus increases the maximum amount of potentially de-
ductible interest expenses in subsequent years. The tax burden from interest add-backs for 
trade tax purposes is relieved by reducing the share of interest included in rent and leasing ex-
penses for immovable property from 65% to 50% (§ 8 No.1 e TTA)22.  
 
The regulations governing the treatment of losses are modified in such a way that loss carry-
forwards are not lost if the acquired, loss-making firm is insolvent and its fundamental busi-
ness structure is preserved after acquisition (§ 8c I a CTA)23. To facilitate business restructur-
ings within groups, loss carry-forwards should no longer be lost if the buying and selling enti-
ty are directly or indirectly owned at 100% by a third party of that group (§ 8c I 5 CTA). 
Moreover, loss carry-forwards should not be lost due to changes in the shareholding structure 
to the extent of hidden reserves included in domestic business property (§ 8c I 6 f CTA). To 
stimulate investments, the declining balance depreciation has been reintroduced at a rate of 
25% for two years (§ 7 II ITA)24.  
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper presented a new corporate microsimulation model, ZEW TaxCoMM, which allows 
for the coherent micro-based analysis (ex ante and ex post) of reform induced revenue impli-
cations and the distribution of the tax burden between firms of different characteristics.  
 
                                                            
20  Act on an improved consideration of insurance contributions for tax purposes (Gesetz zur verbesserten 
steuerlichen Berücksichtigung von Vorsorgeaufwendungen). 
21  Act on the “Acceleration of Economic Growth” (Gesetz zur Beschleunigung des Wirtschaftswachstums). 
22  Act on the “Acceleration of Economic Growth” (Gesetz zur Beschleunigung des Wirtschaftswachstums). 
23  Act on an improved consideration of insurance contributions for tax purposes (Gesetz zur verbesserten 
steuerlichen Berücksichtigung von Vorsorgeaufwendungen). 
24  Act implementing the tax regulations included in the package of measures of “Securing Jobs by 
Strengthening Growth” (Gesetz zur Umsetzung steuerrechtlicher Regelungen des Maßnahmenpakets 
“Beschäftigungssicherung durch Wachstumsstärkung“). 
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In this paper, ZEW TaxCoMM was employed to evaluate the distributional and revenue con-
sequences of the German corporate tax reform 2008. For 50% of the corporations in the sam-
ple, the effective tax burden on cash flow is reduced by between 1.13 and 8.4 percentage 
points. On the other hand, despite the important tax rate cuts, 5% of all firms considered ex-
perience an increasing or unchanged tax burden. As regards revenue implications, ZEW Tax-
CoMM determines average revenue losses of € 9.817 billion. The decline is higher for corpo-
rate income tax, the trade tax thus gaining in importance.  
 
The German corporate tax reform 2008 followed the persistent international trend of tax rate 
cut cum base broadening reforms and especially of detaching the tax base from profits by re-
stricting the deduction of business expenses. Hence, the results on the distribution of the tax 
burden according to firm characteristics stand exemplarily for other reforms following a simi-
lar pattern. 
 
ZEW TaxCoMM shows explicitly that high profitability, low debt ratio and low capital inten-
sity favour a strong decline in the tax burden measure. The results of a simple estimation ap-
proach with OLS confirm these findings for a ceteris paribus setting.  
 
The analysis showed that tax rate cut cum base broadening reforms, especially when detach-
ing the tax base from profits by banning the deduction of business expenses, additionally en-
danger the existence of firms in times of massive economic downturn. Policy makers in Ger-
many and other countries reacted by modifying the most harmful regulations, which implied 
the taxation of economic worth instead of profits. 
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